Borrowing Constraints, Portfolio Choice, and Precautionary by Michael Haliassos & Christis Hassapis
Borrowing Constraints, Portfolio Choice, and Precautionary Motives:
Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Complications
by
Michael Haliassos




First Draft: June 24, 1998
This Draft: September 14, 1998
We are grateful to Carol Bertaut, Chris Carroll, Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano, Nick
Souleles, Guglielmo Weber, and Joachim Winter for very helpful discussions. We
have benefited from comments by participants at the Savings and Pensions TMR
conference (Tilburg), the Economics and Finance seminar series at CSEF (Italy), and
the Capital Markets conference (Cyprus) for useful comments. Mary Karatsi-Christou
provided excellent research assistance. We thank the European Union and the
Research Committee of the University of Cyprus for financial support. Part of this
research was completed while the authors were visiting the Center for Studies in
Economics and Finance at the University of Salerno (Italy), which provided an
excellent research environment.Borrowing Constraints, Portfolio Choice, and Precautionary Motives:
Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Complications
by
Michael Haliassos





This paper studies effects of two classes of borrowing constraints, collateral-
and income-based, on wealth accumulation, portfolio behavior and on precautionary
motives. We examine the sensitivity of solutions to tightness of constraints, education
level, and preference parameters. The models are calibrated using the 1992 Survey of
Consumer Finances. The idea that constrained households engage in less borrowing
and less holding of risky assets than desired is borne out for income-based constraints
but not necessarily for constraints where assets also serve as collateral. The
commonly used nonnegativity constraint on wealth turns out to be a very special case
among collateral constraints: not only is constrained consumption equal to income but
precautionary wealth holding is zero. Income-based constraints reverse the sign of
precautionary effects on holdings of risky assets, and so do relatively tight collateral
constraints. The latter reverse the sign of precautionary effects on borrowing, as well.
Precautionary effects on wealth holding and on borrowing are smaller when income-
based constraints are binding, though not necessarily so for collateral constraints.
Results suggest that inclusion of constrained households in a sample of unconstrained
ones is quite likely when using standard wealth-level cutoffs for sample splitting, and
that it tends to bias empirically observed precautionary effects on wealth downwards.
Estimated precautionary effects on risky assets and on borrowing may even be biased
towards zero. These findings may help explain the failure of recent empirical studies
to uncover sizeable precautionary effects on wealth and on portfolio composition.
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1. Introduction
Modern analysis of consumption-saving behavior has long been dominated by
the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis, recently augmented to incorporate
income risk and precautionary motives.
1 Its standard form rules out liquidity
constraints and typically abstracts from portfolio choice. The two modeling choices
reinforce each other: the assumed absence of quantity restrictions on asset holdings
and of an interest-rate wedge removes two reasons for consideration of portfolio
choice. Their combination underplays the potential importance of financial market
conditions, monetary policy, and credit tightness for consumption and welfare.
Econometric and calibration studies have shown the potentially rich
implications of both factors. Deaton (1991) showed through computation that
borrowing constraints (nonnegativity of the single asset) can have substantial effects
on saving in the presence of nondiversifiable labor income risk. Estimation often
shows excess sensitivity of consumption to changes in income, and liquidity
constraints are thought of as strong, though not the only, candidates for explaining it.
2
Recent empirical literature has shown the explicit relevance of credit variables for
consumption in financially developed countries.
3 Unlike constraints with constant
borrowing limits, endogenous (and potentially time-varying) constraints introduce a
role for credit conditions in influencing consumption and welfare. These include
limits that depend on income and collateralizable assets and are potentially different
across households, countries, and time periods. They also nest nonnegativity
constraints on wealth or debt, allowing examination of their special nature.
Studies that incorporate portfolio choice, often combined with background
labor income risk, find important interactions between saving and portfolio decisions
even without liquidity constraints, identify portfolio and return puzzles that challenge2
some premises of standard models, and show nontrivial precautionary portfolio
effects.
4 Yet, empirical studies have yielded mixed results regarding the existence and
quantitative importance of precautionary influences on saving and portfolio choice
(see Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzesse, 1992, 1996; Hochguertel, 1998).
Papers studying effects of borrowing constraints on portfolio choice under
labor income risk include Constantinides et al. (1998), Gakidis (1998), Hochguertel
(1998), Koo (1991), Marcet and Singleton (1991), and Paxson (1990). Constantinides
et al. argue that borrowing constraints can contribute to explaining both the high
equity premium and the low riskless rate, since they prevent the young from
borrowing to invest in stocks. Gakidis examines a version of the buffer stock
hypothesis extended to incorporate portfolio choice. Hochguertel and Koo investigate
the effects of nonnegativity constraints on wealth, effectively requiring 100%
collateral for borrowing and implying equality of consumption with income.  The
borrowing limits considered by Marcet and Singleton are a specific fraction of labor
income. Paxson derives some analytic results for a version of collateral constraints.
This paper studies influences of income- and collateral-based borrowing
constraints on wealth accumulation, portfolio behavior, and precautionary motives.
Robustness of the findings is checked by computing solutions for three education
categories and associated stochastic processes for labor income, and by varying
preference parameters. Calibration is based on the 1992 Survey of Consumer
Finances. An important innovation is that the paper compares effects of various
degrees of constraint tightness for two classes of (potentially) time-varying
constraints, nesting standard specifications of nonnegativity constraints on wealth and
on debt. Extensive comparisons are made possible by use of a small-scale model. In
addition to uncovering new effects and assessing the robustness of others, these3
comparisons suggest a possible explanation for the failure of empirical studies to date
to uncover sizeable precautionary effects using household-level data.
The idea that constrained households engage in less borrowing and less
holding of risky assets than desired is borne out for income-based constraints but not
necessarily for constraints where assets also serve as collateral. The commonly used
nonnegativity constraint on wealth turns out to be a very special case among collateral
constraints: not only is constrained consumption equal to income but precautionary
wealth holding is zero. Income-based constraints reverse the sign of precautionary
effects on holdings of risky assets, and so do relatively tight collateral constraints. The
latter reverse the sign of precautionary effects on borrowing, as well. Precautionary
effects on wealth holding and on borrowing are smaller when income-based
constraints are binding, though not necessarily so for collateral constraints. Results
suggest that inclusion of constrained households in a sample of unconstrained ones is
quite likely when using standard wealth-level cutoffs for sample splitting, and that it
tends to bias empirically observed precautionary effects on wealth downwards.
Estimated precautionary effects on risky assets and on borrowing may even be biased
towards zero.
Section 2 describes the two types of constraints. Section 3 presents the model
and calibration procedure. Section 4 discusses effects of each type of constraint on
wealth accumulation and portfolio choice. Section 5 derives precautionary effects for
the two types of constraints. Section 6 draws implications for the estimated size of
precautionary effects when borrowing constraints are not fully accounted for, and then
discusses criteria for splitting samples into constrained and unconstrained households.
Section 7 offers concluding remarks.4
2. Borrowing Constraints
2.1.  Income-based Constraints
The first class of constraints we consider involves a borrowing ceiling tied to
income. This is motivated by the argument that ability to repay is related to earning
capacity, and that current earnings are a good proxy for future earnings potential.
5
Formally, borrowing is not allowed to exceed a proportion (or multiple) k of income:
0 , > £ - k kY B t t .                                                         (1)
Notice that the borrowing limit is not conditioned on other portfolio components, and
that it is not manipulable by the household, as it relates to exogenous labor income.
6
If the constraint is binding in period t, then Bt+kYt=0, and net worth is Wt=St-kYt.
When net worth exceeds this amount, the constraint is not binding. Thus, constrained
net worth is a function of the tightness parameter k, and of holdings St that are
endogenous and themselves a function of constraint tightness.
2.2. Asset-based or Collateral Constraints
Perhaps the most widely researched quantity constraint on borrowing is the
nonnegativity constraint on net wealth, Wt‡0. This constraint allows borrowing up to
exactly the amount of collateral provided by assets that are included in computation of
financial net worth. Nothing else can be used as collateral, including human wealth. In
a single-asset model, this amounts to the restriction that borrowing cannot take place
at all (unless debt liabilities are fully backed by positive holdings of the same asset as
the one issued in order to borrow). Regardless of the asset menu, constrained
consumption must always equal current income.
A natural generalization in a two-asset model is to consider constraints of the form
0 , ‡ £ - b bS B t t                                                      (2)5
where B stands for net holdings of bonds (and –B stands for net borrowing) at the
riskless interest rate;
7 S is the other asset entering computation of net worth; and b is
an institutional parameter describing collateral requirements, i.e., the tightness of the
constraint.
 8 The familiar constraint Wt‡0 then becomes a special case for b=1. The
practice of ruling out short sales of both bonds and stocks is encompassed by the case
b=0 (or equivalently k=0). The constraint preventing short sales of stock is never
binding in any of our experiments. Cases where net borrowing is restricted to be a
fraction (or even a multiple) l of net worth, i.e.
0 , ‡ ￿ £ - l W l B t t ,                                               (3)
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which is subsumed in constraint (2) above for b<1.
An important feature of collateral constraints is that the ceiling on borrowing is
manipulable through portfolio selection, since it is related to holdings of other assets.
This has interesting and sometimes surprising implications, as will be seen below.
When constraints are binding in period t, net worth is equal to (1-b)St. Otherwise, net
worth exceeds this product. Thus, constrained wealth is equal to zero only for b=1,
but it is otherwise endogenous and depends on the tightness of constraints and on all
other factors determining asset holdings St, including preferences and stochastic
income processes. This point will be important in some of what follows.
Which assets are subsumed under S depends, of course, on the model at hand. It is
not unusual for collateral assets, financial or real, to bear some risk. In what follows,
we focus on consumer loans and on risky financial collateral that offers an expected
return premium over the loan interest rate. In two-asset models with bonds and stocks,7
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 where A0 is initial (inherited) wealth, PSt is the nominal stock price in period t, N the
number of stocks, B the nominal amount in bonds, d real dividends per share, I the
nominal rate of interest on the riskless asset, P the price of the good, and tb the tax rate
on interest and dividend income.
At the end of the first period, the household decides how to allocate labor
income between current consumption and saving in either riskless or risky assets
offering an expected return premium. These are held over the second period, when it
is subject to stochastic income shocks. Thus, the household is faced with career
uncertainty, the size of which depends on its education level, as described below. At
the end of the second period, just before retirement, the household adjusts its wealth
holding and portfolio mix to hold during retirement. Retirement income is assumed to
be nonrandom, but dependent on the household’s education, as also in Hubbard,
Skinner and Zeldes (1994, 1995). By the end of that period, the household decides how
to divide up current after-tax resources (i.e., retirement income, stock accumulation,
dividend payments, any bond holdings minus accumulated debt and associated
interest payments) between final consumption and bequests. The model incorporates
taxation on income, interest, and dividends, but not on capital gains.
10 Interest and
dividend tax rates are higher for college graduates than for those of lower education.
3.2. Calibration
Calibration of cumulative stock returns is based on a binomial model of annual
stock returns that matches the first two moments of the long-run empirical return
distribution estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985) [see also Haliassos (1994)].
 Stock8
returns can take a high or low value equal to the expected value plus or minus
(respectively) the standard deviation of 20-year holding returns. Consistent with the
historical findings of Schwert (1990), expected dividend yields are calibrated to about
half the expected total pre-tax return on equity. The twenty-year riskless rate is
compounded from the Mehra-Prescott mean annual riskless rate. Under no correlation
between income and stock returns and no retirement income risk, the model has four
second-period and eight third-period states. Its small scale allows us to solve it a large
number of times, exploring alternative parameter configurations.
In calibrating income, we follow the approach introduced in Bertaut and
Haliassos (1997). We distinguish between households with (i) less that high-school
education (LTHS), (ii) high-school education (HS), and (iii) at least a college degree
(COL). In models without income risk, the household is guaranteed the average
population income for the relevant age-education cell, computed from the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF). Incomes under certainty are equal to expected incomes
under career uncertainty and both are equal to average population incomes computed
from the data.
11 Income risk is introduced in the form of lognormally distributed,
multiplicative stochastic shocks to annual incomes, which follow processes estimated by
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994):
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In our end-of-period model, first-period income is known by the time the first
decision is made, and third-period income is assumed nonstochastic. The relevant
income measure is the present value of incomes over twenty-year periods. Present values9
for both periods are set equal to the population averages for the corresponding age-
education cell. Second-period income is stochastic and its analytical moments are not
readily computed from the assumptions on annual income shocks. We therefore
stochastically simulate annual incomes (for ages 40 to 60) and generate 10,000 present
value realizations for each education level. These take into account serial correlation of
annual income shocks, and they are used to compute expected present values and their
standard deviations. The “high” and “low” values for each education level equal the
expected present value plus or minus one standard deviation, respectively.
12
Our “benchmark” value for relative risk aversion is 3, which is often used for
representative-agent models. We solve all model variants for g between 2 and 10, viewed
by Mehra and Prescott (1985) as the plausible range given the size of the stockholding
“gamble”. Initial wealth, A0, is set to zero, unless otherwise noted. The rate of time
preference is set at 3.13% per annum, around the values typically assumed, matching the
estimate in Siegel (1993) for the historical average riskless rate over a very long horizon.
The weight l given to bequests in final-period utility is assigned the benchmark value of
0.25 that gave plausible results in Bertaut and Haliassos (1997).
4. Effects of Borrowing Constraints on Saving and on Portfolio Choice
4.1. Income-based constraints
The introduction of an income-based borrowing constraint (see Section 2.1)
discourages not only first-period borrowing but also stockholding and consumption,
and results in higher financial net worth. Figure 1 shows wealth holding and portfolio
composition under various degrees of constraint tightness for a high-school dropout
with no initial wealth. It also includes wealth-to-income ratios of a “rich” household10
that has initial wealth equal to first-period income. The latter has positive
unconstrained net wealth, as it desires to move resources to the future, and is only
constrained if it faces very tight borrowing limits (i.e., very low k).
By contrast, the household with no initial wealth wants to borrow to finance
stockholding and consumption in view of its expected increase in future labor income,
and it expects its consumption to grow over time. Thus, when unconstrained (either
facing no constraint or a constraint with k exceeding 60%),
13 it desires to be a net
borrower, and this makes it a good candidate for binding borrowing constraints.
When the household is unable to borrow as much as desired, it is forced to cut
back both on stockholding and on current consumption (Fig. 1). The former happens
because its ability to take advantage of low-interest borrowing to invest in stocks with
higher expected yield is now being restricted. The latter is reflected in increased
financial net worth. Even when no borrowing is allowed, i.e. k=0, households
sacrifice some current consumption to invest in stocks, so as to take advantage of the
equity premium. This holds even for relative risk aversion as high as 20.
The reduction in stockholding and borrowing and the increase in net worth are
monotonic in the tightness parameter k. Thus, the conjecture that households facing
tighter constraints will reduce borrowing and stockholding is confirmed. Constrained
net worth exceeds its unconstrained level, which is equivalent to saying that
constrained households will consume less than desired in their first period of working
life [equation (8)]. Current consumption is reduced by binding constraints even
though the household could have preserved it by further cutbacks in the holdings of
other assets. This happens although holdings of other assets cannot be used as
collateral. The driving force behind this result is the expected return premium.11
Table 1 shows that the looser the constraint, the greater is expected future
consumption and its ex ante variability, based on first-period information. Both
effects are direct consequences of the result that looser constraints allow more current
and expected future borrowing and stockholding, not only as levels but also as asset-
to-income ratios. The equity premium and the increased stockholding financed
through debt create expectations of greater future consumption and larger bequests,
but contribute to increased uncertainty.
The slopes of second-period asset-to-income ratios, plotted as functions of
tightness k, depend on whether stock returns turned out to be high or low. In high-
return states, all asset-to-income ratios are larger the less tight the constraint; in low-
return states, the opposite tends to be true.
14 This can be explained as follows. A less
tight constraint (larger k) means that the household was allowed to expose itself more
to stockholding risk in its initial portfolio. As a result, the high-return states involve
even bigger (and the low-return states even lower) realized wealth, as the constraint
becomes less tight. Asset holdings are then positive functions of realized wealth.
As expected, less tight constraints are associated with higher expected lifetime
utility, and actual utility in high-return second-period states. However, they imply
more misery in low-return states, because they allow households to be less
conservative with their portfolios in the first period of life.
Surprisingly, binding constraints can produce a reversal of the usual rankings of
stockholding by risk aversion (Fig. 2). When the first-period constraint is binding,
borrowing is equal to kY. Regardless of constraint tightness, the more risk averse have
higher net worth. Based on the findings of Haliassos and Hassapis (1997) for
alternative preference specifications and no constraints, the main source of the higher
net worth is that under expected utility the more risk averse have lower elasticity of12
substitution, which governs wealth-to-income ratios. We find here that this effect on
wealth is so powerful for constrained households, as to dominate the downward
pressure on stockholding generated by higher risk aversion.
4.2. Collateral constraints
Effects of collateral constraints (see Section 2.2) are qualitatively similar across
education groups, and are illustrated by considering high-school graduates with risk
aversion of 3 (Fig. 3). Again, we show the portfolio of a household without initial
wealth, and wealth-to-income ratios for another with initial wealth equal to first-
period income. The unconstrained wealth of the “rich” household is positive, and
constraints do not bind for b as low as 0.5. However, the unconstrained solution for
the other household, shown past the vertical line, implies substantial borrowing
relative to current income, to finance consumption and risky asset holdings. As a
result, unconstrained net worth is negative, making it a candidate for binding
borrowing constraints over a wider range of tightness b.
Under a 100% collateral requirement, we have the familiar constraint Wt ‡ 0 and
b=1. Constrained consumption is equal to income, and net wealth is zero. Note,
however, that this is the only specification of a collateral constraint for which these
equalities hold, since constrained wealth in general is (1-b)S and holdings of the
collateral asset are positive. As we also found for income-based constraints, net worth
is higher when constraints are tight enough to bind. The explanation in Section 4.1 is
reinforced here by the attractiveness of the risky asset as collateral.
As the constraint is gradually relaxed from b=0, allowing the household to borrow
a larger fraction of collateral, wealth holding decreases and therefore consumption
(the difference between the given income and wealth holding) increases.
15 For b<1,
constrained net wealth is positive, and this means that all of borrowing and some part13
of labor income are devoted to financing the purchase of stocks, in order to build up
collateral and to take advantage of the equity premium.
16 For b>1, constrained net
wealth is negative implying that consumption exceeds labor income and is partly
financed through borrowing. The constraint is binding in at least one period or state
17
for all runs shown using b £1.4.
Interestingly, both stockholding and borrowing can “overshoot” their
unconstrained levels. First-period stockholding attains its maximum (among the runs
shown) for b=1.1, and then starts to fall towards its unconstrained value.
18 The peak in
borrowing occurs for a less tight constraint, at b=1.3.
19 When either stockholding or
borrowing reaches its unconstrained level for the first time, consumption (wealth) is
still below (above) its unconstrained value. The rise of consumption towards its
desired level does not require a monotonic increase in borrowing, since stockholding
also drops and this frees up resources. Stockholding can fall even while borrowing
increases, since borrowing is given by bS, b increases, and S is already large.
20
Ex ante consumption variability for the second and third periods is influenced,
though not necessarily reduced, by binding borrowing constraints. The crucial aspect
is not whether the constraint is binding per se, but whether it induces more limited
exposure to debt and to stock return risk. For low b, when the constraint is tight and
both stockholding and borrowing are limited, variability is well below the level
corresponding to the unconstrained case. As the constraint becomes less tight,
variability initially increases. At b=1, representing the constraint Wt‡0, variability is
above its unconstrained value for all education levels.
21 At higher b, when both first-
period stockholding and borrowing are moderated, variability is somewhat reduced
until it attains its unconstrained value.14
Figure 4 compares high-school dropouts with degrees of risk aversion equal to
three and four. Even this small difference can influence whether the constraint is
binding, as well as asset-to-income ratios. When risk aversion is 4, constraints with
0£b<1.3 are binding, while the corresponding range for risk aversion of 3 is bigger
(0£b<1.7). Lower risk aversion adds to the desire for borrowing more than it adds to
tolerance of the risky asset, even with its dual role as collateral. Differences in risk
aversion create wider portfolio disparities when constraints are less tight.
Figure 5 shows effects of education, which determines the stochastic process
for income. Predictions are quite close, except for a range close to the threshold b
beyond which constraints do not bind. The already noted “overshooting” of risky
asset holding and borrowing above their unconstrained levels is more pronounced for
the more educated households. A key factor behind this result is the lower variance of
both persistent and transitory income shocks facing households with higher education.
5. Precautionary Motives
Precautionary effects are measured as the difference in predictions between a
model without income risk and one where expected income is the same but the
household faces income risk. The presence of borrowing constraints introduces the
possibility that such comparisons involve borrowing-constrained solutions or even
one constrained and one unconstrained solution. In the latter case, the constraint is
binding only in the absence of income risk, since the household is then more prone to
borrow. This section shows that borrowing constraints can alter substantially the size
and often the sign of precautionary effects, depending on their type and tightness.15
5.1. Effects of introducing income-based constraints
Figure 6 refers to high-school dropouts with no initial wealth and risk aversion
of 3. Similar pictures are obtained for all education categories, degrees of risk
aversion, and for different levels of initial wealth, with adjustments to the values of k
at which constraints cease to be binding. The Figure shows that precautionary wealth
is positive, regardless of whether constraints bind or not, but that it is smaller under
binding constraints.
In the range of k where constraints are not binding, the “temperance” effect of
background income risk on desired stockholding (identified by Kimball, 1993) is
quantitatively smaller than the effect of prudence. In other words, income risk curtails
unconstrained stock demand by considerably less than it reduces borrowing (or
increases riskless asset holdings). Indeed, since prudence boosts aggregate wealth but
temperance reduces wealth (by reducing its risky component), this difference in size
is necessary if we are to observe both a precautionary wealth buffer and a reduction in
risky holdings among unconstrained households.
The conflict between prudence and temperance is taken to extremes when
households are constrained facing income risk and without it. Since borrowing is at
the (same) limit in both constrained solutions, a precautionary wealth buffer is not
provided through reductions in borrowing. Instead, it is provided through increases in
risky asset holdings. Prudence and temperance are no longer observed
simultaneously: prudence prevails and temperance is reversed. Notice that this
reversal occurs even though the household could generate precautionary wealth by
decreasing borrowing below the allowable limit. It does not choose to do so,
regardless of whether borrowing is used only to finance stockholding or also
consumption. The increase in risky asset holdings is bigger for less tight (but binding)16
constraints. Faced with less tight constraints, households can both afford to buy more
of the risky asset and feel more secure in doing so, since they can borrow more in
future bad states. This reversal of temperance will have important empirical
implications, discussed below.
For k equal to 0.6, the household with risky income becomes unconstrained,
but it remains constrained with respect to the borrowing it would have undertaken if it
were not faced with income risk. From this point on, the precautionary effect on bond
holding increases and attains its maximum when the household becomes
unconstrained even in the absence of income risk. Prior to this, the increase in
precautionary wealth arises solely because the progressively more lax constraint
allows the household to increase the borrowing it would have undertaken under no
income risk. Its borrowing under income risk is already at its unconstrained level. The
increase in riskless asset holding (reduction in borrowing) soon replaces risky asset
holdings in providing for a precautionary wealth buffer, and temperance is restored.
5.2. Effects of introducing collateral constraints
Figure 7 shows precautionary effects under asset-based constraints for a
household with less than high school education. Effects for other education groups are
qualitatively similar. The constraint is not binding for values of tightness, b, to the
right of the vertical line, regardless of whether income is risky or not. Under binding
constraints, precautionary effects depend on collateral requirements, b.
The most commonly used constraint, Wt‡0 corresponding to b=1, yields
constrained precautionary wealth equal to zero. The reason can be inferred from Fig.
7. Precautionary wealth is the difference between predicted wealth under income risk
and under no income risk. For unconstrained solutions (to the right of the vertical
line), removal of income risk increases desired borrowing more than desired17
stockholding. This is just another way of saying that desired precautionary wealth is
positive. Thus, given that the household does not meet the collateral requirement
under risky income, removal of income risk will generate a further shortfall of
collateral (or, equivalently, a further drop in desired wealth). Since the constraint is
binding under both risky and riskless income, net wealth is zero in both cases, and so
is their difference, i.e. precautionary wealth. The Figure also shows the special nature
of this constraint: for most degrees of tightness, precautionary wealth effects are
positive, though smaller, than under non-binding constraints.
When collateral constraints are tight (low b), we observe a reversal of the
negative precautionary effect on risky asset holdings, which parallels our finding for
income-based constraints. In this range of b values, the first-period borrowing
constraint is binding regardless of whether income is risky or not.
22 Constrained first-
period wealth is equal to (1-b)S (see section 2.2). The desire to build a precautionary
wealth buffer (prudence) dominates the tendency to reduce exposure to risky assets in
response to background labor income risk (temperance).
23
It follows that there is also a reversal in the sign of precautionary effects on
borrowing, as also seen in the Figure. Since first-period borrowing constraints are
binding regardless of the presence of income risk in this range of b values, borrowing
is equal to bS. A positive precautionary effect on stockholding implies a positive
effect on borrowing.
At higher values of b, when the constraint in the worst second-period state no
longer binds, precautionary effects on stockholding and borrowing switch signs.
Initially (around b=1), the reduction in borrowing is offset by a reduction in
stockholding, without a change in consumption. For less tight b, however, riskless18
asset holdings (or equivalently reductions in borrowing) take on the brunt of
providing precautionary wealth, which climbs up to its unconstrained value.
6. Implications for Empirical Testing
Two important issues arise in empirical testing of household saving and
precautionary motives using modern household-level data. One is whether and how
failure to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained households in a sample
can bias empirical estimates of precautionary wealth accumulation and portfolio
choice. The second is the practical issue of how to distinguish between constrained
and unconstrained households in a sample. This section utilizes our findings in order
to answer the first question and to discuss methods and complications regarding the
second.
6.1. Estimating Precautionary Effects
Our findings suggest that if a sample of supposedly unconstrained households is
contaminated with constrained ones due to imperfect allowance for borrowing
constraints (see below), then estimates of the size of precautionary wealth effects will
be biased downwards, and possibly insignificant. This is because precautionary
wealth holdings were found to be nonnegative but smaller among constrained
households than among their unconstrained counterparts of the same demographic and
preference characteristics (see Figs. 6 and 7). Indeed, they were shown to be zero
under binding constraints of the standard form Wt‡0.
Figs. 6 and 7 also suggest that some constrained households may exhibit positive
precautionary effects on risky assets, unlike their unconstrained counterparts and
some other constrained households. Given their sign ambiguity, contamination of the19
unconstrained sample may lead to the conclusion that income risk bears no systematic
relationship to the demand for the risky asset or even a positive one.
24
In Figs. 6 and 7, the size of precautionary effects crucially depends on the
tightness of the constraint. Thus, credit conditions matter for the size of precautionary
effects, not only by determining the proportion of constrained households but also by
altering the tightness of binding constraints. There seems no reason to expect
estimates of precautionary effects to be constant through time in countries
experiencing changes in credit policy and financial market development.
25
6.2. Sample Splitting Criteria
A number of empirical papers testing the PIH and a few estimating the size of
precautionary saving and portfolio effects adopt the practice of splitting household
samples into those likely to be constrained and unconstrained. Often, sample splits are
based on comparisons, Wt‡x, of asset holdings to some prespecified cutoff level
(typically zero). A known criticism is that observed wealth, Wt, is itself endogenous.
26
In this subsection, we argue that the appropriate cutoff, x, far from being universal, is
itself endogenous and model-dependent in general.
A careful and highly influential paper of this type is Zeldes (1989b), in which
households are classified as unconstrained if their relevant measure of current wealth
exceeds two months’ worth of (average past) income.
27 Zeldes assumes that
households have the same preference parameters and face the same constraint, Wt‡0,
if any. Tests for the validity of first-order conditions rely on the consistency of
parameter estimates for the unconstrained group under both the null of no constraints
and the alternative. This in turn requires that the “unconstrained” group contain no
currently constrained households. The analysis focuses on currently binding
constraints, and results are broadly supportive of their presence, though not always20
consistent across different sample splits and tests. Our analysis suggests that use of a
universal cutoff at zero may contaminate the unconstrained sample with constrained
households and jeopardize the validity of tests for borrowing constraints. This may
help explain the varying success of tests based on different sample splits.
Generally, the problem arises because constrained wealth is equal to (1-b)St
(or to St-kYt under income-based constraints; see Figs. 1,2). Even when the researcher
knows the institutionally relevant value of b or k, the appropriate cutoff is neither
preference- nor model-free in general. If all households indeed face the same b or k,
the cutoff depends on the endogenous value of St. If some face tighter borrowing
constraints than others and/or credit conditions evolve over time, then b and k are also
household- and time-dependent. Part of the appeal for using tests based on first-order
conditions is lost, as they may not eliminate the need for explicit consideration of the
income process and other characteristics at the preliminary stage of sample splitting.
Figure 4 shows the effects of a small difference in relative risk aversion (3
versus 4) under collateral constraints. The less risk averse tend to borrow more, invest
more in stocks, and have lower net wealth. Thus for b„1, risk aversion tends to
influence both whether a particular household is constrained, and its asset holdings. If
the constraint is tighter than Wt‡0 (i.e., b<1), then a cutoff wealth level at zero would
include in the supposedly unconstrained subsample the “rich” unconstrained
households with positive wealth shown in Fig. 3, but also constrained agents with risk
aversion of 3 or 4.
If households face heterogeneous constraints, Figs. 1-4 imply that setting a
universal cutoff level at zero contaminates the unconstrained sample with households
that have positive wealth precisely because they face tighter, binding constraints than
Wt‡0. Moreover, the extent of sample contamination can vary over time as credit21
markets (and b and k) evolve. It is even possible for some unconstrained households
to be excluded if their preferences induce them to be net borrowers.
The intertemporal nature of the saving-portfolio problem further reduces the
appropriateness of numerical cutoffs. Fig. 8 shows wealth-to-income ratios for a high-
school dropout, unconstrained in its second period of working life, as a function of
the return-income state realized. For k shown below 0.6 (in both periods), the
constraint was binding in the first period. It is clear that current unconstrained status is
consistent with a variety of wealth levels, depending on whether the borrowing
constraint was binding in the first period.
28 It is even possible for households to be
unconstrained currently and in the past (facing constraints to the right of the vertical
line), and to hold smaller wealth than others previously constrained (to the left of the
vertical line).
Table 2 uses data from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to illustrate the
possible magnitude of misclassification when using a universal cutoff level close to
zero (at two months’ worth of last year’s income).
29 It compares this criterion to one
based on direct Survey responses indicating binding constraints and controls for age
and education.
30 Predictably, the percentage of constrained households based on either
criterion falls as education or age rise. Comparison of the first two rows, however,
indicates that the wealth-based criterion tends to classify significantly more
households as constrained than implied by Survey responses. More striking is the
third row, which shows the extent of contamination of the “unconstrained” sample
selected on the basis of wealth, with households that actually responded they were
constrained. The problem is especially acute for lower education and younger
households, among which liquidity constraints are more prevalent. The last row
shows that a significant percentage of those who did not indicate binding constraints22
in their Survey responses are classified as being constrained by the asset-based
criterion simply because they have very low wealth.
If b and k are known to the researcher and common to all households, model-
free sample-splitting criteria can still be specified, but they are portfolio restrictions.
31
To be included in the unconstrained group, a household should have net wealth above
(1-b)St (or St-kYt  respectively).This criterion reduces to nonnegativity only if
institutions require b equal to one (i.e., a 100% collateral requirement). Problems
arising from heterogeneous constraints can also be avoided by portfolio restrictions,
but this now requires knowledge of the household-specific b or k values.
Barring direct knowledge of the nature and history of constraints, a researcher
may adopt a conservative approach of including in the unconstrained subsample only
households that satisfy portfolio restrictions for large b or k.  However, when
preference heterogeneity is prevalent, this tends to select those who simply prefer to
borrow a lot. Testing the validity of first-order conditions might still be warranted, but
using preference parameter estimates from the unconstrained subsample to test the
validity of the same conditions in the rest of the sample would appear problematic.
There remains the issue of detecting binding constraints expected in some
future states or in states that did not materialize. Although these tend to influence
behavior of currently unconstrained households, there are no data to examine portfolio
restrictions. Direct survey questions regarding expectations, motives for saving, and
past experience with credit constraints can be useful, but it is unlikely that they will
cover the entire span of time periods and contingencies incorporated in intertemporal
models in order to identify globally unconstrained households.
 32 The biases identified
in Section 6.1 are likely to persist, unless accurate indicators of constraints are used or
tests are devised that do not rely on the absence of constrained agents.
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7. Concluding Remarks
Our findings suggest that borrowing constraints, either income-related or
asset-based, can have substantial influence on household saving, portfolio choice, and
on the size and direction of precautionary effects. This influence varies with their
degree of tightness. The popular nonnegativity constraint on net wealth turns out to be
quite special in implying not only equality of consumption to income but also the
absence of precautionary effects on wealth. The often assumed borrowing ceiling at
zero implies smaller precautionary wealth than constraints relating borrowing ceilings
to income or collateral, and it reverses the sign of precautionary effects on risky asset
holding. More generally, standard temperance effects on risky assets, arising from the
introduction of background income risk, are reversed if the desire to avoid exposure to
additional financial risk is dominated by the motive to build up precautionary wealth.
We found this to be the case for income based constraints that are binding in the
presence of income risk, and for a subset of collateral constraints. When temperance
is reversed, collateral constraints reverse the sign of precautionary effects for
borrowing, as well.
Thus, erroneous inclusion of constrained households in an unconstrained
sample is likely to bias downwards estimates of precautionary effects on wealth, and
to yield small or insignificant estimates of precautionary effects on risky asset holding
and on borrowing. Identifying globally unconstrained households, over time and
across the state space, with a high degree of accuracy is worthwhile but challenging.
Taken together, these findings point to a possible explanation for the failure of recent
empirical studies to uncover sizeable precautionary effects on saving and portfolios.24
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Table 1
Effects of the Tightness of Income Based Constraints on Endogenous Variables
k 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
W/Y 0.009 -0.040 -0.090 -0.130 -0.170 -0.190
S/Y 0.109 0.160 0.210 0.270 0.330 0.400
B/Y -0.100 -0.200 -0.300 -0.400 -0.500 -0.600
E(C2) 18702 19254 19884 20664 21655 22753
Std(C2)/ E(C2) 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.41
E(C3) 19972 20640 21428 22269 23337 24520
Std(C3)/ E(C3) 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.62
E(Bequests) 13848 14311 14857 15440 16181 17001
Std(Beq)/ E(Beq) 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.62
E(W/Y)2 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.46 0.52
E(S/Y)2 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31
E(B/Y)2 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21
W
1/Y
1 0.46 0.51 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.81
W
2/Y
2 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22
W
3/Y
3 0.40 0.51 0.65 0.81 1.00 1.20
W
4/Y
4 0.07 0.002 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15
Exp. Lifetime U 16099 16558 16896 17121 17245 17278
U
1 26017 27535 29260 31355 33842 36455
U
2 21225 20672 20141 19652 19207 18854
U
3 17551 19069 20794 22889 25376 27989
U
4 12653 12185 11675 11186 10741 10388
Notes:  1. Std stands for Standard Deviation, Beq. stands for Bequest, W stands for Wealth, S
for Stocks, B for Bonds, U for Utility, C for Consumption and k is the maximum proportion
(or multiple) of income one can borrow according to –Bt£kYt, k>0.
2. Superscripts denote states, subscripts denote time periods.28
Table 2: Comparison of Survey Responses on Constraints





High School College or More
Age <40 40-59 >60 <40 40-59 >60 <40 40-59 >60
Constrained based
on W criterion (%)
90 74 49 71 54 27 53 34 12
Constrained based
on Responses (%)












91 71 45 65 48 26 48 28 11
Source: 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Notes:  W criterion classifies as credit constrained those with wealth less than or equal to
2 months’ worth of last year’s income. Response criterion classifies as credit constrained
those who responded that they were denied credit or received less credit than requested
(and did not subsequently reapply or apply elsewhere and receive full amount) or did not
apply because they thought that the application would be rejected.29
FIGURE 1
Portfolios Under Income Based Constraints
W/Y stands for the Wealth to Income Ratio, S/Y for the Stocks to
Income ratio, and B/Y for the Bonds to Income Ratio. High-school dropouts. (W/Y)r refers to
households with initial wealth equal to first-period income.
FIGURE 2
Portfolios Effects of Risk Aversion Under Income-based Constraints
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FIGURE 3
Portfolios Under Asset Based Constraints
Portfolios of high-school graduates. (W/Y)r refers to households with initial wealth equal to
first-period income.
FIGURE 4
Portfolio Effects of Risk Aversion under Asset Based Constraints
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FIGURE 5
               Portfolios Effects of Income Processes and Asset-Based Constraints
LTHS and HS stand for Less than High School and High School Education. Risk aversion is
equal to 3.
FIGURE 6
Precautionary Effects under Income Based Constraints
D(…/…) stands for the Precautionary Effect on the Corresponding Ratio. High-school
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Precautionary Effects Under Asset Based Constraints
High-school graduates with risk aversion of 3 and no initial wealth.
FIGURE 8
State-dependent Wealth to Income Ratios in the Second Period
W/Y stands for wealth to income ratios in the four possible second-period states. State
1: high stock return, high income; State 2: low stock return, high income; state 3: high
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1 Pioneers in building single-asset, precautionary saving models were Leland (1968) and Sandmo
(1970), to be followed by a number of subsequent contributors (e.g., Kimball, 1990, 1993; Zeldes,
1989a; Carroll, 1992, 1997; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994). 
2 For surveys, see Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Deaton, 1992; Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995.
3 See, for example, Alessie et al. (1997); Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997); Chah et al. (1995); Ludvigson,
(1998).
4 Contributions to this literature include Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991;
Attanasio, Banks, and Turner, 1998; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995, 1997; Poterba and Samwick, 1995;
Bertaut, 1997; Haliassos and Hassapis, 1997; Hochguertel, 1998).
5 For example, Marcet and Singleton (1991) argue that financial institutions commonly impose a
constraint that the costs of servicing personal debt not exceed one-third of personal income. In their
case as in ours, of one-period debt, the constraint applies to the repayment of principal and interest on
loans. Ludvigson (1998) models the credit limit as a function of current income. A difference between
both of these papers and ours is the length of the time period considered. Since ours is a long-run
model of twenty-year periods, it does not necessarily imply year-by-year variation of credit limits
depending on the income shocks experienced during each year. It rather relates borrowing over the
entire period to the present value of incomes obtained, taking into account both transitory and
persistent income shocks insofar as they influence the longer-term income measure.
6 Even under endogenous labor-leisure choice, what matters for credit limits in our model is the longer-
run career outcome rather than short-term fluctuations in labor supply. The assumption of exogenous
labor income is typically made in models with nondiversifiable labor income risk. For an exception, but
without borrowing constraints, see Bodie et al. (1992).
7 In what follows, we consider only one-period loans, where the period is long. Thus, the amount of
borrowing undertaken in each period (a flow) is equal to the amount of debt (a stock) that will be held
between the current period and the next. Thus, we will be using “borrowing” and “debt”
interchangeably, unless there is a reason to differentiate them.
8 In multi-asset models, it is even possible to expand the constraint specification introducing different
parameters bi for each collateral asset i.
9 Using stocks as collateral for consumer loans may appear somewhat artificial, although it is often an
implicit assumption in models with bonds and stocks. As a matter of fact, the financial services sector
offers such possibilities to consumers. Citibank, for example, offers to consumers the possibility of
using stocks as collateral for loans, so that consumers can avoid liquidating them and having to pay
transactions costs and capital gains taxes. The accounts contain provisions for adjusting the units of
stock placed as collateral when stock prices (and hence collateral values) change.
10 For a discussion of some issues arising from taxation of capital gains, see Haliassos and Lyon
(1994).
11 As the introduction of lognormally distributed shocks alters expected incomes, suitable adjustments are
made to the income values used in calibration so as to remove this effect (see Bertaut and Haliassos, 1997).
12 In our calibrations, we use the following income values, scaled to represent incomes which if
received each year over a twenty-year period would yield the present values derived in our stochastic
simulations.  Yt refers to income in period t,, while h and l refer to the high and low income states
respectively.  For high-school dropouts, [Y1, Y2h, Y2l, Y3]= [15019, 30088.5, 13219.5, 13633]. In
models without income risk, Y2 =21570. For high-school graduates, [Y1, Y2h, Y2l, Y3]=[25920, 48691,
26219, 22032] and Y2=37583. For College graduates, [Y1, Y2h, Y2l, Y3]=[39483, 96010, 55338, 49663]
and Y2=75527.
13 When discussing cutoff values of constraint tightness parameters b and k we refer to the calibration
experiments shown on the Figures (as highlighted points on the various schedules). It is possible, but
probably not worthwhile, to be more exact in depicting cutoffs by running experiments for finer
parameter grids.
14 This monotonicity result is violated only for the stock-to-income ratio in the worst state that involves
low incomes and low stock returns.
15 We have found an exception for a small segment at very low b values where wealth rises slightly and
then falls. In this range of very low b’s, both borrowing and stockholding are small. Relaxation of the
constraint encourages investment in the risky asset offering the return premium and this effect slightly
dominates the downward pressure on wealth because of increased borrowing. As stockholding becomes
more sizeable, the magnitude of effects is reversed.34
                                                                                                                                                              
16 It may seem unintuitive that households are constrained to have positive net wealth. In fact, they are
only constrained to have net wealth equal to (1-b)St, but they choose to hold a positive amount of the
collateral asset, partly because of its return premium and partly because of its usefulness as collateral.
17 For runs shown with b£0.3, exposure to debt and to stockholding risk is substantial and causes the
borrowing constraint to bind in the worst second period state when both income and asset returns are
low. For 0.4 £b£1.4, the constraint binds only in the first period, while no constraint binds for b‡1.5.
18 The same pattern is followed by stock- and bond-to-income ratios in the second-period states
involving high stock returns. The corresponding ratios for the second-period states involving low stock
returns fall throughout this range of b.
19 This is easy to see algebraically. Stockholding, as a function of constraint tightness, is S(b), and it
peaks when S’(b)=0. Constrained bondholding is equal to -bS(b), representing borrowing, and its slope
is -S(b)-bS(b), which is equal to –S(b)<0 when stockholding peaks.
20 Although this phenomenon is of interest as a possibility, we have not found it to be an inescapable
feature of collateral constraints. It seems to vanish for households with high initial wealth, which
suggests that it is more likely to apply to collateral holdings of households with low initial resources.
21 This is consistent with the finding of Koo (1991) who had focused exclusively on the case b=1 in a
continuous-time, infinite-horizon setup and found that borrowing constraints increase the variability of
the growth rate of consumption. Our findings suggest, however, that the sign and magnitude of the
effect depend on the degree of tightness of the constraint.
22 Under income risk, the borrowing constraint in the worst second-period state is also binding.
23 Interestingly, Koo (1991) had found such a positive effect on stockholding in his infinite-horizon,
continuous-time framework, but for the case b=1, which was the only case he considered. The reversal
occurred only for a low ratio of initial wealth to income. In our benchmark calibration setups, this ratio
is zero, and the reversal is not observed for b=1 but only for tighter constraints. The finding suggests
that the reversal is not necessarily associated with constraints of the form Wt‡0 and low initial wealth,
but it is a function of preference and income process parameters as they relate to initial wealth and to
the tightness of the constraint.
24 For example, Hochguertel (1998) occasionally finds positive effects when not allowing for liquidity
constraints.
25 Of course, saying that liquidity constraints would introduce coefficient biases does not necessarily
imply that small estimated effects imply the existence of liquidity constraints. It is possible that other
factors can be identified in future research, which are also consistent with observed estimates.
However, the findings of Haliassos and Hassapis (1997) regarding non-expected utility specifications
imply that various departures from expected utility are unlikely to explain the estimates, since they
enhance precautionary wealth accumulation. A reversal of the precautionary effect on stockholding
occurs only under the extreme assumption of piecewise linear indifference curves, but this leads to
deterioration in predictions along other dimensions.
26 Recently, Attanasio et al. (1998) proposed an interesting approach to handling this problem, focusing
on the related criterion of splitting a sample between stockholders and nonstockholders (St>0).
27 Wealth is defined either to include housing or to exclude it in case it is highly illiquid and cannot be
borrowed against. Non-housing wealth refers to liquid wealth in the form of checking or savings
accounts or government bonds.
28 The sign of the relationship of the wealth-to-income ratio to the tightness of the borrowing constraint
depends on whether a high- or a low-return state has been realized (states 1 and 3 versus 2 and 4,
respectively). The reason for this was explained in Section 4.1.
29 We are grateful to Carol Bertaut for drawing our attention to these data.
30 Specifically, the criterion classifies as constrained households that indicated that they were denied
credit or received less credit than requested (and did not subsequently reapply or apply elsewhere and
receive full amount) or did not apply because they thought that the application would be rejected.
31 Figures 2 and 5, also suggest that the role of risk aversion in differentiating constrained asset
holdings is smaller under tighter constraints. Although the use of a universal cutoff is less objectionable
under tight constraints and limited heterogeneity of preferences, the appropriate cutoff is not numerical
but model-dependent. Again, use of portfolio restrictions can eliminate the problem.
32 A recent example is Jappelli et al. (1998), who employ the Survey of Consumer Finances. A
household is classified as constrained if it has been turned down for a loan or it has failed to get as
much credit as desired in the past, or it has been dissuaded from applying for credit in the past.
33 Meghir and Weber (1996) propose an ingenious test of first-order conditions for the different
purpose of discriminating between intertemporal nonseparabilities and borrowing constraints.